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ABSTRACT
Critical diversity studies (CDS) can be found within “traditional” or “established” 
university disciplines, such as philosophy, as well as in relatively newer departments 
of the university, such as African studies departments, women’s and gender studies 
departments, and disability studies departments. In this article, therefore, I explain 
why philosophy of disability, an emerging subfield in the discipline of philosophy, 
should be recognized as an emerging area of CDS. My discussion in the article situ-
ates philosophy of disability in CDS by both distinguishing this new subfield’s claims 
about disability from the arguments about disability that mainstream philosophers 
make and identifying the assumptions about social construction and antiessentialism 
that philosophy of disability shares with other areas of CDS. The discussion is de-
signed to show that a (feminist) philosophy of disability that draws upon the work of 
Michel Foucault will transform how philosophers understand the situation of disabled 
people. By drawing upon Foucault, I offer philosophers of disability and other practi-
tioners of CDS a new understanding of disability as an apparatus of power relations.
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Philosophy of Disability in Critical Diversity Studies (CDS)
When academics talk about “critical diversity studies” (hereafter referred to as CDS), it is 
generally assumed that they are referring to the relatively recent interdisciplinary fields of 
inquiry that are variously based on identity, social position, group membership, shared 
experience, and history: women’s and gender studies, Africana studies, LGBTQI studies, 
and disability studies. Programs in some or all of these (and other) fields of CDS are now 
included in the curricula of most universities and colleges worldwide. Furthermore, many 
universities around the world have degree-conferring departments in at least some fields 
of CDS. In some institutions, one can major in fields of CDS, while in other places, one 
must combine one’s work in, say, disability studies or critical race studies, with a more 
“traditional” or established discipline such as philosophy, where the latter—philosophy—
is regarded as one’s major area of specialization (for which a degree is conferred), while 
the former—disability studies or critical race studies—is regarded as one’s minor area of 
specialization (for which a diploma or certificate may be conferred).
Nevertheless, forms of CDS can increasingly be found within “traditional” disciplines 
themselves; that is, a growing number of university and college departments that house 
age-old, conventional disciplines offer courses that enable specialization in areas that are 
most aptly identified as varieties of CDS, areas of specialization that talk back to, or even 
against, the established disciplines within which they reside. Throughout the last decade 
especially, philosophy has, reluctantly, become one such discipline. For despite a great 
deal of conservative resistance and even hostility from certain corners of philosophy, a 
steadily growing number of philosophy departments offer courses in feminist philosophy, 
philosophy of race, queer theory, and other CDS areas. The subject matter of these courses 
is respectively designed to transform the discipline of philosophy by challenging the sex-
ism, racism, Eurocentrism, homophobia, heterosexism, and transphobia of claims that 
mainstream philosophers make; critique the methods and “foundational” assumptions of 
Eurocentric, Western philosophy along these lines; and introduce new counter discourses 
and thinkers into the “canon” of philosophy. Indeed, some philosophy departments now 
deliberately utilize areas of CDS as institutional mechanisms and strategies to redress and 
eliminate the Eurocentrism, androcentrism, and whiteness of the discipline of academic 
philosophy, as well as to ameliorate the historical underrepresentation and exclusion of 
some social groups from the profession of academic philosophy.
In this article, I outline the parameters of one area of CDS in the discipline of philosophy— 
namely, philosophy of disability—in part by distinguishing the claims of this emerging 
subfield of philosophy from the claims about disability made in more established, main-
stream, and dominant areas of the discipline. Mainstream philosophy, like other 
“traditional” disciplines of the university, continues to operate under the guise of the val-
ues of neutrality, rationality, and objectivity. Yet, the discipline of philosophy, like every 
one of the disciplines that constitutes the modern university, implicitly promotes certain 
ontologies, methodologies, and epistemologies, that is, certain political, social, economic, 
cultural, and institutional mechanisms and influences condition philosophy and every 
other discipline of the modern university, despite the fact that conventional, established 
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disciplines such as philosophy continue to be represented—and to variously represent 
themselves—as value neutral, detached, disinterested, and impartial. By contrast, philoso-
phy of disability, like other areas of CDS, explicitly represents itself as politically motivated 
in character and socially engaged in content; like other areas of CDS, philosophy of disa-
bility has, more or less, grown out of and remains associated with a social and political 
movement. In what follows, I identify some of the central motivational assumptions of 
philosophy of disability, explain the extent to which these assumptions have roots in disa-
bled people’s movements, and highlight key interventions and contested categories in this 
new subfield of philosophy, this new addition to the roster of CDS.
Situating Philosophy of Disability in Philosophy
Most philosophers continue to hold the view that certain subfields of philosophy—meta-
physics, ethics, logic, epistemology, and philosophy of language—are foundational to the 
discipline of philosophy, uniquely distinguishing philosophy from other disciplines of 
research and teaching and affirming its self-ascription as “the queen of the sciences.” 
Philosophers who circumscribe the “foundations” of philosophy in this way maintain that 
these subfields of the discipline are the necessary, essential, and “core” elements of phi-
losophy, while other subfields of philosophical inquiry—such as philosophy of race, 
feminist philosophy, and philosophy of disability—are (mere) applications and contingent 
derivatives of these fundamental subfields. Furthermore, philosophers who distinguish in 
this way between “core” subfields of philosophy and “applied” subfields of philosophy 
generally regard the questions and concerns that constitute the former subfields as time-
less, disinterested, and universal in character and, conversely, take the questions and 
concerns that constitute the latter subfields to be accidental, interested, and partial (on 
this distinction, also see Shelby, 2007, p. 13). Against this understanding of the architec-
ture of philosophy, my discussion in what follows assumes that every philosophical 
question, concern, and approach, as well as every subfield that these questions, concerns, 
and approaches constitute, is a value-laden artifact of historically contingent and cultur-
ally specific discourses.
My assertion about the historical contingency and cultural specificity of philosophical 
discourses encompasses philosophy of disability itself, as well as its discursive objects. 
Although many, if not most, philosophers of disability presuppose that the phenomena of 
disability are transhistorical and transcultural, identifying claims about disability and 
disabled people in the writings of Plato, Locke, and other philosophers in the distant past 
of Eurocentric, Western philosophy, I maintain that disability is a historically and cultur-
ally specific phenomenon rather than transhistorical and transcultural in character. In 
fact, I want to pinpoint the publication of John Rawls’s A Theory of Justice in 1971 as a key 
fulcrum of the “problematization” of disability in contemporary philosophy and, hence, of 
the form that broad swaths of the discussion about disability currently take in philosoph-
ical discourse. Michel Foucault, in a review of the method that he employed in his studies 
of abnormality, madness, and criminality, introduced the notion of problematization, 
remarking that inquiry into the problematization of a given state of affairs tries to uncover 
how the different solutions to a “problem” have been constructed and how these different 
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solutions resulted from the problematization of that contingent state of affairs in the first 
place (Foucault, 2003, pp. 20–24). My claim that Rawls’s argument in A Theory of Justice 
largely precipitated the problematization of disability in contemporary philosophy is thus 
a claim about the distinct ways in which disability emerged as an urgent problem in phi-
losophy, about how the problem of disability has been constructed in philosophy, and 
about how, within philosophical discourses, certain solutions to the problem of disability 
have come to be advanced.
I also want to pinpoint the publication of Rawls’s text as an inadvertent catalyst for 
critical philosophical work on disability, although I predict that many philosophers and 
theorists of disability will (initially at least) object to my doing so. That is, I want to argue 
that the publication of Rawls’s landmark book and subsequent discussion of it in main-
stream political philosophy contributed significantly to the emergence of the 
counterdiscourse of philosophy of disability. In the aftermath of the publication of Rawls’s 
book, mainstream philosophers have made a concerted endeavor to formulate and 
respond to questions about disability such as these: What, if anything, does society owe to 
disabled people? How should society compensate disabled people for their brute bad 
luck? Is it morally permissible to euthanize severely disabled people? Is it morally permis-
sible to experiment on cognitively disabled people (see Tremain, 2017)? Nevertheless, 
more and more philosophers—some who write in direct response to the set of questions 
about disability that Rawls’s text motivated in mainstream (analytic) political philosophy 
and others whose writing on disability stems from feminist and Foucauldian analyses of 
power, the body, normality, subjectivity, and identity—have contested or defied main-
stream philosophical work on disability by articulating and responding to questions such 
as these: How do accepted philosophical understandings about (say) autonomy, rational-
ity, subjectivity, and individuality fail to account for the circumstances of disabled people’s 
lives? What are the most effective philosophical devices to show that disabled people 
make up a disenfranchised minority? What conceptual tools are required to show that 
disability is a social construction? Although most philosophers of disability assume that 
the subfield of philosophy of disability (as a form of CDS) ought to promote the latter sort 
of question rather than the former sort of question, the pivotal role that Rawls’s A Theory 
of Justice inadvertently played in both the way that the problematization of disability has 
come to be framed in philosophy and how philosophers of disability have responded to 
that problematization cannot be denied.
Let me point out, then, that the questions that mainstream philosophers have asked 
(and continue to ask) about disability largely rely upon a cluster of motivational assump-
tions that take for granted the metaphysical status and epistemological character of 
disability, casting it as a self-evident and hence philosophically uninteresting designation 
that science and medicine can accurately represent. On the terms of this cluster of assump-
tions, disability is a prediscursive, transcultural, and transhistorical disadvantage, an 
objective human defect, that is, a non-accidental, biological human property, attribute, or 
characteristic that ought to be prevented, corrected, eliminated, or cured. That these 
assumptions are contestable and that disability might be a historically and culturally spe-
cific and contingent social phenomenon, a complex apparatus of power rather than a 
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natural attribute or property that certain people possess is not considered, let alone seri-
ously entertained. My argument—an argument with which (most) analytic philosophers 
of disability disagree—is that disability is a historically and culturally contingent appara-
tus of force relations all the way down.
Although critical analysis of disability has made noticeable inroads elsewhere in the 
humanities and social sciences, such analysis of disability—as a politically informed vari-
ety of CDS—remains severely marginalized within philosophy, a state of affairs that 
should be attributed to a complex and complicated set of interrelated factors, including 
the historical composition and demographics of professional philosophy itself; the nar-
rowing concentration of the prevailing subject matter and techniques of philosophy; the 
increasingly close association between philosophy and the sciences; and the otherwise 
limited theoretical, discursive, and political focus of much philosophy. Indeed, the 
assumption that disability is appropriately and adequately addressed in the domains of 
medicine, the life sciences, and related fields has, itself, shaped philosophy departments, 
influencing hiring practices and decisions as well as course curricula, conference lineups, 
the composition of professional networks and editorial boards, the contents of edited col-
lections, and so on (see Tremain, 2017; also see Tremain, 2010, 2013, 2014). In short, the 
assumption that disability is a philosophically uninteresting human characteristic, on one 
hand, and the underrepresentation of disabled philosophers and continued marginaliza-
tion of philosophy of disability are mutually constitutive and mutually reinforcing, 
entangled and entwined.
Mainstream Philosophy as a Catalyst for Philosophy of 
Disability
In A Theory of Justice, Rawls advanced a social contract theory in the terms of which 
members of a given society would, under conditions of uncertainty, choose two principles 
of justice that apply to the “basic structure of society.” The first principle—the principle of 
liberty to which Rawls gave lexical priority—confers upon any given member of society 
equal right to the most extensive liberties compatible with the enjoyment of the most 
extensive liberties by all other members of society. The latter principle—one component 
of which Rawls dubbed “the difference principle”—holds that offices and positions must 
be open to all people under conditions of equal opportunity and that social inequalities 
are acceptable that work to the benefit of the most disadvantaged members of society. 
Under circumstances of justice (construed as conditions of scarcity), Rawls argued, these 
two principles would be recognized as mutually advantageous by “normal and cooperat-
ing citizens” to whom information about their respective social positions, personal 
characteristics, occupations, place of birth, sex, and so on is unavailable. Although Rawls 
argued that the counterfactual character of the conditions of uncertainty that his justice as 
fairness imposed was a heuristic device (“device of representation”), the nature and func-
tion of the device has been hotly debated: both lauded as intuitively appealing by 
proponents of Rawls’s theory and ridiculed by opponents of the theory who charge that 
(among other things) such “ideal theory” obscures, and indeed fosters, social inequalities. 
Charles Mills (2005) has argued, for instance, that Rawls’s famous distinction between 
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ideal and nonideal theory is reductive and undermines, if not ignores, the knowledges 
that members of marginalized groups produce.
In “Equality of What?” philosopher and economist Amartya Sen (1979) claimed that 
Rawls misunderstood the requirements of justice and therefore chose the wrong “metric” 
by which to measure improvements in people’s circumstances and hence the wrong basis 
for a theory of justice. For Sen, a theory of justice ought to be directed at what people can 
respectively “do” and “be,” that is, ought to attend to their respective functionings and 
capabilities rather than revolve around the distribution (in some uniform, undifferenti-
ated fashion) of opportunities and other goods. Sen argued, furthermore, that insofar as 
Rawls’s theory of justice as fairness covered over differences between people—enabled by 
the Rawlsian distinction between “natural” disadvantages (deemed to be morally arbi-
trary) and “social” disadvantages (deemed to be morally relevant)—Rawls circumscribed 
the domain of justice too narrowly. In Sen’s view, Rawls’s justice as fairness, if imple-
mented, would likely lead to dire consequences for the very people—including disabled 
people—that a theory of justice should most urgently assist because the Rawlsian distinc-
tion between natural and social disadvantages situates the concerns and requirements of 
these people outside the scope of justice, that is, in the realm of benevolence and good will 
or in the domain of health care, a domain that Rawls did not regard as integral to the basic 
structure of society. Although Sen recognized that a theory of justice must address distri-
bution to disabled people, he nevertheless naturalized disability, ultimately locating the 
“problem” of disability in disabled people themselves, as Ronald Dworkin (1981a), among 
others, has noted.
In a set of two articles, respectively titled “What Is Equality? Part 1: Equality of 
Welfare” and “What Is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources,” Dworkin (1981a, 1981b) 
offered additional responses to the “problem” of disability that Rawls, initially, and Sen, 
subsequently, identified. Whereas the former article encompassed Dworkin’s criticism of 
both Rawls’s justice as fairness and Sen’s capability approach, the latter article advanced 
Dworkin’s own argument that resources should be the metric (to use Sen’s term) by which 
to measure improvements in social justice. Dworkin agreed with Sen that Rawls erred 
insofar as he deemed the possession or lack of “natural” characteristics, talents, and 
capacities to be morally arbitrary and thus not the appropriate subject matter of a theory 
of justice. Nevertheless, Dworkin disagreed with Sen about the appropriate way for a the-
ory of justice to address (so-called) natural human variation. In fact, central to Dworkin’s 
theory of equality of resources was a proposal formulated to incorporate what Rawls had 
removed from consideration in his theory of social justice. The proposal took the form of 
a hypothetical insurance market designed to “compensate for handicaps,” that is, make 
cash payments to “handicapped” people based on their assessments and calculations of 
the opportunity costs that accrued to them due to their “handicaps.” Dworkin believed 
that his hypothetical insurance scheme improves upon “welfarist” approaches to social 
justice for disabled people. In another context, I have argued, however, that the design of 
Dworkin’s insurance market violates his own recommendations for equality because such 
an insurance market would compel disabled people to accept an argument that threatens 
to compromise, if not undermine, their self-respect (Tremain, 1996). I want to point out, 
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furthermore, that insofar as mainstream political philosophers have generated the prob-
lematization of the apparatus of disability thus, that is, insofar as they have conceived the 
social inequalities that accrue to disabled people as the inevitable consequences of a self-
evident physiological, or natural, human characteristic (property, difference, or attribute), 
they have presupposed certain assumptions about the relation between biology and soci-
ety that philosophies of disability and my philosophy of disability in particular aim to 
undermine.
Social Construction and Activist Origins of Philosophy of 
Disability
In her 2016 Tanner Lectures, Dorothy E. Roberts astutely describes how asymmetrical 
relations of social power are naturalized in certain academic discourses, distinguishing 
heuristically between two approaches to the question of the relation between biology and 
society: “the old biosocial science” and “the new biosocial science.” As Roberts explains it, 
the former approach posits that biological differences produce social inequality, whereas 
the latter approach posits that social inequality produces biological differences. The bio-
logical determinism of the old biosocial science, Roberts notes, is achieved in several 
ways: first, nature is separated from nurture, with allegedly inherent traits rather than 
imposed social structures, identified as the origins of social inequalities; second, social 
inequalities are claimed to be reproduced in and through the bodies of socially disadvan-
taged people rather than reinvented in and through unjust ideologies and institutions; 
third, problems that stem from social inequality are claimed to derive from the threats 
that oppressed people’s biology itself poses to society rather than from structural barriers 
and state violence imposed upon oppressed people; and fourth, the old bioscience endeav-
ors to intervene and fix perceived biological deficits in the bodies of oppressed people 
rather than end the structural violence that dehumanizes them and maintains an unjust 
social order. By contrast, the new biosocial science, Roberts explains, posits that every 
single biological element, every single biological process in the human body, every human 
cell, and everything that happens to a human cell are affected by society. In short, there is 
no natural body. As Roberts (2016) points out, both epigenetics and social neuroscience 
show that biology is not a separate entity that interacts with the environment; rather, these 
interactions constitute biology (see also Gilman & Thomas, 2016; Prinz, 2012; Roberts, 
1998, 2012).
Current and emerging areas of CDS crucially rely upon arguments about the social con-
struction of biological phenomena and the cultural significance that accrues to these 
phenomena. In fact, the enormous attention now paid to social constructionism throughout 
the humanities and social sciences, as well as in some of the natural sciences, is due in large 
part to the compelling role that debates about social construction and essentialism have 
played in areas of CDS. Although philosophers of disability disagree about what disability is, 
as well as how, and the extent to which, disability is socially constructed, assumptions about 
the social construction of disability are at the heart of philosophy of disability.
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During roughly the same historical moment that contemporary mainstream political 
philosophers elaborated arguments about justice and disability, effectively initiating the 
problematization of disability in philosophy, disabled people themselves, both within and 
outside of the university, and at various sites across the globe, began to advance their own 
social constructionist claims to entitlement, articulating their own convictions about 
what justice for disabled people requires. In the last decades of the twentieth century, two 
geographically and ideologically distinct social movements coalesced, each with its own 
terminology to signify the conceptual objects of disability. It is from these formative 
grassroots social movements that the academic field of disability studies, as an interdisci-
plinary area of inquiry, indeed as an area of CDS, emerged.
In 1976, the Union for Physically Impaired Against Segregation (UPIAS), an activist 
group in the United Kingdom that understood social relations in historical materialist 
terms, articulated a set of principles in which they argued that the situation of disabled 
people is largely socially manufactured. The principles were intended to counter the med-
icalized understanding of disability according to which disability is a natural or biological 
defect that ought to be prevented, eliminated, or corrected. The motivation for the UPIAS 
principles was a distinction between impairment (construed as a natural human attribute) 
and disability (construed as a form of social disadvantage) that has become generally 
known as the “social model of disability” or simply “social model,” but which, to avoid 
ambiguity (see Tremain, 2017, esp. pp. 9–11), I refer to as “the British social model of dis-
ability” (“BSM”). In the terms of the BSM, disability is the form of social disadvantage 
imposed upon “people with impairments” by a social system that discriminates against 
them and excludes them from full participation in social life. For proponents of the BSM, 
this form of social disadvantage (disability) is neither equal to nor a necessary conse-
quence of people’s impairments. Proponents of the BSM thus claim that their conception 
of disability breaks the causal link between one’s embodiment and personal circumstances 
(impairment) and one’s cultural location and social circumstances (disability). Indeed, 
proponents of the BSM argue that the distinction between impairment and disability that 
their model institutes is the single most important innovation of the contemporary “disa-
bled people’s” movement. Given that disability is not a necessary consequence of 
impairment, they argue, governments and policymakers should create policies and prac-
tices that mitigate the social disadvantages (such as discrimination in housing, 
employment, and education) that people with impairments confront rather than direct 
resources and goods to medical research and technology that aim to correct people with 
impairments themselves (Oliver, 1996).
Although historian of disability Paul Longmore (2003) traced activism by “people 
with disabilities” in the United States to the Great Depression in the 1930s, most disabil-
ity theorists and activists locate the beginnings of the American “disability rights” 
movement in the early 1970s when Ed Roberts and other “students with disabilities” at 
the University of California at Berkeley formed a group called “The Rolling Quads” to 
protest their poor living conditions on the UC-Berkeley campus. When this group of 
students with disabilities and their allies opened the first “Independent Living Center” 
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(ILC) in Berkeley, it is said, the American disability rights movement was born. Roberts 
and other “disability activists” in the United States, who were spurred on by the successes 
of the Independent Living Movement, the women’s movement, and the Black civil rights 
movement, as well as by the ideological assumptions of liberal individualism, went on to 
fight long and hard for legislation that would institutionalize a tripartite conception of 
disability into U.S. domestic policy. On the terms of this conception, a disability is under-
stood as a functional limitation caused by an impairment or biological deficit, a limitation 
in function often met with social prejudice and exclusion, which was initially referred to 
as “handicap,” though is now referred to as “disability discrimination” (see Tremain, 2017 
for an explanation for this transition). The claims to entitlement that early American 
disability activists advanced—understood in terms of civil rights and equal opportunity— 
were ultimately institutionalized in the American With Disabilities Act of 1990, which, 
to many activists, signaled the emergence of people with disabilities as a bona fide social 
minority group.
Like the activism of feminist movements internationally, global LGBTQI movements, 
the Black civil rights movement in the United States, and other diasporic people’s move-
ments worldwide, the activism of disabled people’s movements in the United Kingdom, 
United States, and elsewhere has motivated disabled people and their allies to steadily take 
up space within the university. As I noted at the outset of this article, disability studies 
courses and programs are now offered in universities and colleges virtually everywhere 
around the world. As I have pointed out, furthermore, disability scholars and researchers 
can be found worldwide in many “traditional” university and college departments, includ-
ing philosophy departments.
Philosophers of disability increasingly address issues pertinent to disability that 
nondisabled academics have either omitted from serious consideration or have misrep-
resented in ways that detrimentally affect disabled people. Philosophers of disability 
also increasingly work to identify and challenge the ableist assumptions that constitute 
and contribute to many of the taken-for-granted assumptions of Western European phi-
losophy on which contemporary philosophers rely and thus continue to reproduce. 
That is, philosophers of disability variously concentrate on the assumptions and biases 
about disability that philosophical claims presuppose as well as on how disabled people 
have been either vilified within Euro-American, Western philosophy or exiled from it. 
Indeed, the approaches to disability that philosophers of disability advance, resist and 
run counter to the dominant conceptualization of disability that is persistently elabo-
rated within bioethics, cognitive science, and mainstream political philosophy and 
ethics especially, according to which disability is a natural deficit, personal misfortune, 
or pathology that necessarily reduces the quality and worth of disabled people’s lives 
and inevitably leads to the social and economic disadvantages that disabled people con-
front. Insofar as practitioners of the Euro-American philosophical tradition have, with 
few exceptions, cast disability as a natural, negative, and inert state of affairs in this way, 
they have largely removed disability from the realm of philosophical inquiry and kept at 
bay philosophical debate and questioning about its epistemological, ethical, and politi-
cal status. By contrast, philosophers of disability both use and take a critical stance 
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toward the history of philosophy and the contemporary practice of mainstream phi-
losophy to variously elaborate new ways in which to think about disability and about 
the current social, political, cultural, and economic position of disabled people. They 
do so by employing the very methods, concepts, analytical rigor, and argumentative 
tools of the Euro-American, Western philosophical tradition and the discipline of phi-
losophy in which they were trained.
Feminist Influences in Philosophy of Disability
Many philosophers of disability are also feminist philosophers. Like philosophers of dis-
ability, feminist philosophers take a critical approach to the methodologies, values, and 
concerns of traditional areas of philosophy. They question the assumptions and biases 
upon which these established areas of philosophy rely, identifying how these assumptions 
and biases reinforce forms of social subordination, especially with respect to gender. In 
stark contrast to the disinterested and disembedded approach that mainstream philoso-
phers advocate, feminist epistemologists and feminist philosophers of science have argued 
that philosophical inquiry must take account of information about the social contexts 
from which both philosophical questions emerge and responses to them are generated, 
including the subjectivity and social positioning of any given questioner and respondent. 
For example, Sandra Harding, among others, has argued that information about the sub-
jectivity and social situation of knowers can provide valuable insights into the assumptions 
and biases on which a given position relies (see Harding, 1986, 1991, 2015). To advance 
this claim, Harding and other feminist philosophers assume some version of “standpoint 
epistemology.”
Feminist standpoint epistemologies variously postulate that people in subordinated 
social positions have, by virtue of their subordinated social status, understandings of 
social relations that are superior to—that is, more complete and objective than—the 
understandings of these relations that members of privileged social groups have (see 
Dotson, 2011, 2012; Harding, 1986, 2015; Hartsock, 1983). Alison Wylie points out that 
standpoint theory is an explicitly political social epistemology whose “central and moti-
vating insight is an inversion thesis” (Wylie, 2003, p. 26). As Wylie explains it, standpoint 
theory holds that people who are subjected to systemic forms of domination may be epis-
temically privileged, that is, may, by virtue of their experiences, have access to different or 
better kinds of knowledge than people who are comparatively privileged. Feminist stand-
point theorists, Wylie notes, “argue that gender is one dimension of social differentiation 
that may make a difference epistemically.” The aim of feminist standpoint theorists, she 
writes, “is to both understand how the systematic partiality of authoritative knowledge 
arises—specifically, its androcentrism and sexism—and to account for the constructive 
contributions made by those working from marginal standpoints (especially feminist 
standpoints) in countering this partiality” (Wylie, 2003, p. 26).
Feminist philosophical insights about situated knowledges have influenced feminist 
philosophers who work on disability, especially given the commitment of feminist stand-
point theorists who—however much they otherwise disagree—concur that standpoint 
theories must not “presuppose an essentialist definition of the social categories or 
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collectivities in terms of which epistemically relevant standpoints are characterized” (Wylie, 
2003, p. 26; emphasis in Wylie). Indeed, philosophers of disability who incorporate feminist 
insights into their philosophy of disability critically evaluate the arguments of other philoso-
phers and theorists of disability through the concepts, political commitments, critical 
insights, and personal investments that shape feminist, anti-ableist, antiracist, class- 
conscious, and antiheterosexist theory and practice.
My feminist philosophy of disability shares many features with other feminist philoso-
phies of disability, some of which features distinguish varieties of feminist philosophy of 
disability from work done elsewhere in the broad, interdisciplinary field of feminist dis-
ability studies. Nevertheless, the feminist philosophy of disability that I hold relies upon 
an understanding of disability that distinguishes it from other feminist philosophies of 
disability, in addition to distinguishing it from other theories in feminist disability stud-
ies. Other feminist philosophies and theories of disability uncritically retain some of the 
unsavory elements of dominant theoretical approaches to disability insofar as they vari-
ously conceive disability as (1) the functional manifestation of an intrinsic characteristic, 
a biological difference, or a property (attribute)—for example, an impairment—that cer-
tain people embody or possess and that gives rise to certain forms of social discrimination 
against them; (2) the form of discrimination and oppression imposed upon people who 
have an intrinsic characteristic, attribute, or property construed as a human difference; or 
(3) some hybrid of (1) and (2) in which the relation between disability (as a functional 
limitation or form of social oppression) and, say, impairment (as an intrinsic characteris-
tic, a property, or a difference that some people embody or possess) may not be clearly 
defined or may fluctuate from one context to another context, though, terminologically 
speaking, emphasis is placed upon the former (that is, disability). Although these appar-
ently distinct conceptions of disability diverge from each other in some important ways, 
they depend upon roughly the same assumptions about the epistemological and onto-
logical status of impairment and disability, as well as upon the same assumptions about 
social power, including the assumption according to which power is fundamentally 
repressive and external to preexisting objects upon which it acts. I disagree with all these 
assumptions (see Tremain, 2017).
Foucault and Philosophy of Disability
Following Foucault, I assume that social power is productive of the objects on which it 
acts and is diffused throughout society and culture rather than first and foremost repres-
sive and centralized, as these other feminist conceptions of disability assume. In other 
words, my disagreement with these other conceptions of disability stems from the assump-
tions about causation that they make and the epistemological and ontological status that 
they implicitly confer upon the categories of impairment and disability. Whereas other 
feminist philosophers of disability variously conceive of disability as the functional out-
come of a natural human characteristic, a human variation or difference, an identity, or a 
form of oppression in relation to which impairment is assumed to be the anterior, or 
prediscursive, foundation, as I have indicated, I regard disability as what Foucault referred 
to as an “apparatus” (dispositif) of relatively recent force relations. Impairment, I maintain, 
PhilosoPhy of Disability as CritiCal Diversity stuDies 41
International Journal of CRITICAL DIVERSITY STUDIES 1.1 June 2018
is an element of this apparatus produced as its naturalized and naturalizing foundation, 
that is, impairment is both an effect of and a mechanism of the apparatus of disability. In 
“The Confession of the Flesh,” Foucault (1980, p. 194) defined an apparatus (dispositif) as 
a thoroughly heterogeneous and interconnected ensemble of discourses, institutions, 
architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, scientific statements, administrative meas-
ures, and philosophical, moral, and philanthropic propositions that responds to an 
“urgent need” in a certain historical moment. In other words, an apparatus is a historically 
specific and dispersed system of power that produces and configures practices toward 
certain strategic and political ends.
Many philosophers of disability, some of whom identify as “analytic” philosophers, 
dispute my claims about the social construction of impairment, especially my claim that 
impairment is as socially constructed as disability, is the naturalized foundation of (the 
apparatus of) disability. Some philosophers of disability who dispute this claim—that is, 
my claim according to which impairment is as artifactual as disability—think that the 
claim is unrealistic. They think that it is extreme. They dismiss the idea that impairment 
is a social artifact by arguing that impairments must be real (as in ontologically funda-
mental) things because some impairments are “really” bad or “in reality” bad and would 
continue to be (really) bad even if all social discrimination and systemic oppression 
against disabled people were eliminated. They claim that my argument about the social 
construction of impairment denies material reality, corporeality, and the body. Some of 
them point out, furthermore, that insofar as my claim about the social construction of 
impairment denies the material body, my view is susceptible to the same sort of charge 
that some feminist philosophers have directed at Foucault, namely, that (his) arguments 
about the historical constitution and specificity of the body deny the existence of the pre-
discursive, material body with which women have traditionally been associated and hence 
perpetuate an element of women’s subordination and disenfranchisement.
In another context, I labor to address criticisms about Foucault’s alleged denial of the 
material body; in this context therefore, I shall exclusively address the argument accord-
ing to which the (allegedly) inherent badness of impairment undermines claims about its 
social construction (Tremain, 2017). I maintain that claims according to which impair-
ments are bad are like claims according to which criminals are bad: both the category of 
impairment and the category of criminal are entirely made up and ideas about their 
respective badness are part of, indeed, fundamental to, how they are respectively made up, 
part of their construction, a necessary part of their respective designations as the things 
that they are. In short, there can be no politically neutral or value neutral definition or 
description of impairments just as there can be no politically neutral or value neutral 
definition or description of criminals.
Many philosophers (and theorists) of disability do not grasp the social construction of 
impairment because they misunderstand how modern power operates. Indeed, many phi-
losophers (and theorists) of disability, including some feminist philosophers of disability, 
seem to forget that claims about the social construction of this or that are claims about how 
power operates with respect to this or that, how it does its work. Although philosophers of 
disability (and others) who argue against my claims about the social construction of 
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impairment seem to assume that I disagree with them about what can be socially con-
structed, I actually disagree with them about how social construction takes place (as well as 
what is constructed). Most philosophers of disability presuppose what Foucault called a 
juridical or juridico-discursive conception of power according to which power is funda-
mentally repressive, subtracts liberties, withholds rights, and so on. Many of them believe, 
furthermore, that there are (fundamental) entities—such as sexes, impairments, chemicals, 
values, and so on—that exist prior to social practices, entities from which, out of which, 
and through which social construction of derivative entities takes place. As I have noted, 
with Foucault, I contend, to the contrary, that power is primarily productive rather than 
(merely) repressive: it produces objects, discourses, bodies, candidates for true-or-false, 
values, and ontologies, and it constructs identities, relations, practices, and so on. I submit, 
therefore, that until and unless philosophers of disability who criticize my claim(s) about 
the social construction of impairment come to recognize that the crux of our disagreement 
about the social construction of impairment is a disagreement about how power operates, 
a disagreement about whether power is primarily prohibitive or constitutive, a disagree-
ment about whether power operates most effectively through repression or through 
productive constraints, they will not understand the claims nor understand how (the appa-
ratus of) disability operates and thus the effects of their work, including their criticisms of 
my work in this regard, will themselves be limited and constrained, as well as (out)dated.
My use of Foucault’s idea of apparatus enables me to move philosophical discussion 
about disability away from restrictive conceptualizations of it as (for instance) a per-
sonal characteristic or attribute, a property of given individuals, an identity, a difference, 
or a form of social oppression. In addition, my assumption that disability is an appara-
tus, in Foucault’s sense, moves philosophical discussion of disability toward a more 
comprehensive conceptualization of it than other conceptions of disability provide: a 
conceptualization of disability that is (among other things) historicist and relativist and, 
hence, culturally sensitive in ways that other conceptions of it are not. As an apparatus, 
disability is a historically specific aggregate that comprises, constitutes, and is consti-
tuted by and through a complex and complicated set of discourses, technologies, 
identities, and practices that emerge from medical and scientific research, government 
policies and administrative decisions, academic initiatives, activism, art and literature, 
mainstream popular culture, and so on. Although some of the diverse elements of the 
apparatus of disability seem to have different and even conflicting aims, design strate-
gies, and techniques of application, the elements of the apparatus are nevertheless 
co-constitutive and mutually reinforcing.
To understand disability as an apparatus is to conceive of it as a far-reaching and sys-
temic matrix of power that contributes to, is inseparable from, and reinforces other 
apparatuses of historical force relations, including the apparatuses of race, gender, class, 
nationality, age, and sexuality. With this understanding, disability is not a metaphysical 
substrate, a natural, biological category, or a characteristic that only certain individuals 
embody or possess but is rather a historically contingent network of force relations in 
which everyone is implicated and entangled and in relation to which everyone occupies a 
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position. My argument is that the conception of disability as an apparatus, were it taken 
up by philosophers of disability and advanced through CDS and philosophy itself, has the 
potential to (1) radically change the way that philosophers and other academics think 
about disability and disabled people and, ultimately, change philosophy and the university 
themselves; (2) significantly transform the way that disabled people understand them-
selves and their social and political situation; and (3) substantially reconfigure the current 
social, political, and economic relations of power that operate to marginalize and disen-
franchise disabled people.
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